It was heard in mid-February that the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission, which Ethiopians have been viewing with great hope as well as partial skepticism, has been unable to proceed according to its plan due to various overlapping reasons. The House of Peoples’ Representatives of Ethiopia, taking this into consideration and finding the Commission’s challenges convincing, has extended the institution’s term by eight months. The House approved the resolution proposal for the 8-month extension by a unanimous vote. At its 1^st emergency meeting of the 5^th year term held on February 11, 2018, the House of Peoples’ Representatives discussed the Commission’s performance report to date and set future directions. This first edition of the Enderasie’s second year, following this decision of the Representatives, has chosen to provide a broad analysis of the nature of national dialogue, the Commission’s challenges, and our institution’s recommendations in the following manner.

Why towards Dialogue?

As many literatures written on the necessity of national dialogue narrate, when listing the conditions that compel nations to conduct national dialogue, they strongly emphasize that it is when the foundation of a country or the legal legitimacy of a government falls into danger. When such a dangerous situation occurs, the national dialogue is conducted with the primary goal of reshaping the social contract among the government, political actors, and the society. Beyond that, it is mentioned that when a strong friction occurs between pro-change and status quo forces, the elites face tangible pressure to move towards dialogue. In connection with this, broad-based pressures arising from the bottom-up, such as public protests, strikes, or revolutions, also compel governments to come to the dialogue table. Another point that cannot be passed over without mention is that during armed conflict or high political disagreement, nations turn their faces toward dialogue to ease tension and enter into a peaceful transition.

Even though national dialogue has recently gained prominence as a field of social study, in practice, it has been utilized in various countries for many decades. Especially in South Africa, the transitional justice process conducted after Apartheid and the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission have become a great experience for the world in recent times. Beyond South Africa, countries such as Benin, Gabon, Congo, Togo, Mali, and Niger have conducted national conferences at various times to solve economic crises and loss of political acceptance. The dialogues held in Tunisia and Yemen after the Arab Revolution are also cited as additional examples in the literatures written on the subject to lead political transitions.

It is also remembered that the American constitutional drafting process, the transition processes of Portugal and Spain in the 1970s, as well as the activities carried out in Thailand, Afghanistan, and Nepal were processes that had the form of national dialogue. As seen in the processes from Togo to Yemen, national dialogue is becoming a highly preferred way to resolve national crises and conduct inclusive negotiations. However, it should be noted that the process becomes successful when it can include all sectors of society and when it can reach a clear political agreement.

What Led Ethiopia to National Dialogue?

It is undeniable that the causes that led Ethiopia to National Dialogue are complex political, economic, and social contradictions accumulated over centuries. When we look at them broadly, we see that they are disputes with long-unresolved roots, ranging from historical wounds to questions of identity. Throughout its history, rather than seeking lasting solutions for its problems, Ethiopia has persisted in using force as a tool. Because power is seized and maintained by force, a culture of victor’s justice has prevailed. Particularly, grievances created during the expansion process of Emperor Menelik II, the centralized administration of Emperor Haile Selassie, and the repression of the Derg regime have remained unresolved to this day.

Although the ethnic-based federalism that prevailed since 1991 aimed to redress historical injustices, it gave birth to new ethnic conflicts, power struggles, and resource allocation disputes. This system, which has lasted over three decades, is criticized by some for accentuating differences rather than creating national unity. Eight years ago, the widespread public protests that erupted particularly in the Oromia and Amhara regions led to the resignation of former Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn and brought the administration of Dr. Abiy Ahmed to power. The devastating Northern war between the Federal Government and the TPLF also resulted in a significant humanitarian crisis. In addition to these, if we say that the armed conflicts observed in the Oromia and Amhara regions, as well as the identity and resource conflicts seen in Benishangul-Gumuz, Somali, the former Southern, and Afar regions, compelled the country to enter into dialogue, it would merely be presenting the concrete reality in brief.

Constitutional Reform: The Gordian Knot?

Regarding the National Dialogue Commission, about which many are saying much and for which the next eight months are said to be critical, many agree that its heaviest challenge, in view of the agendas collected so far and existing Ethiopian politics, is the national dialogue it may conduct regarding the Constitution. Whether we look at the collected agendas or the regions and areas where agenda collection is expected to take place in the future, it seems that a vast majority of the agendas and the topics raised by future participants as requiring dialogue revolve around one document: the Constitution. If we name this subject the Gordian Knot* of the Dialogue Commission, we would not be far from the truth.

The political conflicts conducted over the past many decades have caused high damage to Ethiopia. This has resulted in long efforts to bring the highly divided country back into one. The absence of agreement among the various peoples of Ethiopia on fundamental issues has been the basic reason for the instability of the state. Particularly since the 1995 Federal Constitution was ratified, the document has remained a controversial issue. The state structure based on ethnicity and language, as well as the breadth of the right to self-determination given to “Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples,” are the primary centers of disagreement. The difference between the supporters and critics of the system has appeared more prominently since the political transition that took place in 2018. The Prosperity Party has also been observed stating that it recognizes the necessity of resolving the constitutional crisis and supports a consensus-based constitutional reform.

The path the government chose to create the necessary agreement is national dialogue, which began three years ago when the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission was established by the House of Peoples’ Representatives. Since that time, questions regarding the Constitution are being referred to the dialogue, and calls for reforms appear to have a chance of becoming a reality. Consequently, it is estimated that the national dialogue could be a critical reason for constitutional reform. It is expected that, in the first stage, it will confirm the existence of a need for reform and, if found necessary, collect the specific details of the desired changes. Additionally, the dialogue aims to create agreement among participants with diverse perspectives. Considering the polarized situation the country is in, it is necessary to remember that the difficulty of achieving this goal cannot be underestimated.

*The expression Gordian Knot originates from an ancient Greek myth and refers to an extremely complex and not easily solvable problem. As the story goes, Gordius, who was the King of Phrygia, tied his wagon to a wooden pillar with a very complex knot; it was said that the ends of the rope were invisible and no one could untie it. After tightening the knot in that manner, it is written that he spoke a prophecy stating, “Whoever unties this knot shall become the king of Asia.” Alexander the Great, who grew up hearing this prophecy, desired to untie the knot with his usual thirst for omnipotence. Alexander, who came to Phrygia in 333 B.C., tried many times to untie the knot but was unsuccessful. Finally, Alexander brought a different solution; as the myth tells it, he drew his sword and, by cutting the knot and splitting it in two, the rope was immediately released. The hermeneutic reading of this story refers to solving a complex problem through a direct and unusually bold action.

While the necessity of a broad-based national dialogue is widely accepted, and inclusive public participation is key to a successful constitutional reform process, there are many who doubt that the current dialogue can bring about true consensus or provide a solution to the constitutional crisis. In fact, concerns are being raised by various politicians that a reform carried out without sufficient agreement could exacerbate the conflict.

The dialogue aims to create national consensus by bringing political and opinion leaders who have differences on national issues, as well as various sectors of society, into public discussion. The eleven-member National Dialogue Commission is mandated with identifying the causes of these differences, drafting agendas, and facilitating inclusive forums at regional and national levels. The Commission is also responsible for submitting recommendation proposals based on the dialogue’s outcomes, as well as supporting and monitoring their implementation.

In addition to its broad duties, the Commission carries many burdens on its shoulders. This is because constitutional reform has great significance; determining the future structure of the Ethiopian state; which could lead the country toward peace or toward further war. The Commission’s findings and suggestions are highly likely to be the basis for constitutional changes and subsequent processes. Therefore, let us note that for any resulting reform to be acceptable, public trust in the Commission as an independent mediator is crucial.

In this regard, several opposition political parties have been criticizing the Commission’s independence from the government and doubting the sincerity of the process. What is concerning is that several competing parties decided not to participate and withdrew from the dialogue. Although many parties returned later, participation has been declining again during the agenda collection period in the Oromia and Amhara regions. In December, seven opposition parties, including Enat Party, the All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP), and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), expressed in two separate statements that the chance of the national dialogue’s success is narrowing. Even so, the Commission is currently making efforts to return non-participating political parties to the dialogue.

A few months ago, in a press conference given by the Commission, it stated that it held discussions with three political parties: the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), AEUP, and Enat Party; however, all parties set preconditions for their return. These include that ongoing conflicts be resolved peacefully and that combatants be included in the national dialogue, as well as that marginalized political parties and imprisoned politicians, journalists, and activists participate in the dialogue. The parties believe that fulfilling these preconditions mainly depends on government bodies. The Commission also stated that it will continue discussions with other parties currently outside the participation.

In view of the Gordian Knot of the Constitution mentioned under this sub-topic, various perspectives have been observed during the agenda collection process. For example, among the points raised by participants in Oromia are the incorporation of the capital, Addis Ababa, into Oromia; the protection of the rights of nations to self-determination, including the right to secession; and that the controversial national flag remain unchanged as it is a symbol of ethnic equality. These constitutional provisions faced strong opposition during the forums in the Amhara region. Furthermore, similar differences were observed among the federal regions.

While there is support for ethnic self-determination at the regional level among Oromia, Somali, and the new regions found in the South; in the Amhara region, requests for reform have begun, arguing that the Constitution is excessively focused on ethnicity. If the process continues, all twelve regions will, in some way, have different opinions on the reform. If the amendment provisions set within the Constitution are strictly followed, any region, as an equal member of the federation, has the constitutional capacity to reject reform proposals submitted regarding ethnic self-governance rights. In this regard, reaching an agreement might require each region to give up its right to self-governance to some extent for the sake of national unity; this, in turn, seems impossible at least under the current concrete reality.

Even though there is a real hope that a constitutional reform could be made in some way in the near future, the chance of success in terms of softening conflicts and bringing peace seems distant. In fact, many, including those who support constitutional change, fear that the current path of reform could worsen the chaos; as the risks of suddenly exiting ethnic federalism are frequently heard being raised by several parties.

What Was Said?

Before we look at the main reasons the National Dialogue Commission presented this past February when requesting a term extension, citing what was stated by the Commission a year ago will make our topic complete. It is remembered that the House of Peoples’ Representatives met on November 10, 2017 to discuss this very issue. At that time, the Commission stated that it required the assistance of the House of Peoples’ Representatives to identify agendas and participants in the Tigray region. Speaker of the House, Honorable Tagesse Chafo, on his part stated, “We will work together in a coordinated manner to create enabling conditions. We will also consult with the region.” The Chief Commissioner of the Commission, Professor Mesfin Araya, explained the Commission’s completed and remaining tasks to the members of the House. “Today, we should have been presenting the report with which we conclude our work and exit,” said the Chief Commissioner, mentioning gaps that prevented his institution from doing so. Prof. Mesfin stated that the conditions encountered in various places over the past three years were among these gaps. “Our work began at a time when there were problems in Western Ethiopia,” the Chief Commissioner said; “Similarly, problems are encountered in Western Oromia. When we started Amhara, there was no problem; currently, however, enabling conditions and relative peace are required.” Professor Mesfin noted that the problems in Western Ethiopia had been resolved and the Commission had fully completed its work in the Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella regions, and he also mentioned the situation in the Tigray region in that report.

The Chief Commissioner said, “We must obtain a full green light to work in Tigray; however, there are preconditions set on that side; we believe this is the responsibility of the House of Peoples’ Representatives.” “We have consulted with the President of the Interim Administration of Tigray region, taking some time,” Prof. Mesfin said; “What we agreed upon in that consultation is that they indeed believe in this national dialogue process, they accept the national dialogue process in principle, and they told us it is appropriate.” The Chief Commissioner added, “They promised us that when conditions are facilitated, we would talk to the cabinet and various sectors of society and that they would connect us.” Mentioning that repeated meetings were held with the President, Prof. Mesfin told the House members, “For obvious reasons, there is no approach where we have fully entered Tigray.” The Chief Commissioner did not detail the reasons he described as “obvious” to the members of the House of Representatives. Although the Commission has not held discussions with the residents of the Tigray region, the Chief Commissioner indicated that discussions were held with civil society organizations and university leaders located in the region.

After Prof. Mesfin presented his report, the Representatives presented questions. The questions presented primarily focused on the participation of armed groups, the Commission’s term of office, as well as the identification of participants and agendas in the Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray regions. On that day, in response to a question asking whether they would conclude by moderating, gathering recommendations, and submitting a report within the remaining three months, Prof. Mesfin replied, “When we took our oath on February 14, 2014, and met an hour later in a meeting led by the Speaker, what we promised was to finish our work within three years. Our agenda since the first day has been to work, finalize, and appear before you.” The Chief Commissioner added, “Regarding time, our readiness is not to ask for this much time to be given to us or for such to be done for us. Our readiness is still to see how far we can reach by working in this remaining time.” Regarding the extension of the Commission’s working time, he explained: “You are the ones who established it; you are the ones who decided on three years. You have the right to say enough after this; you also have the right to say continue. We have nothing to say about that. However, there is a process where we sit down with the Speaker and relevant leaders over time and explain in detail.”

Why Should It Be Extended?

With only one week remaining before the one-year extended working term of the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission was set to expire, the Representatives gave their consent for it to be extended for the next eight months. It was during an emergency meeting on February 11, 2017 that the House of Peoples’ Representatives had extended the time for one year so that the Commission could complete its work. When the Commission presented its half-year work report to the Standing Committee on Democratic Affairs of the House, it stated that time is needed because the agendas collected so far must be properly deliberated upon and viewed in a stable condition. Regarding the Tigray region, where the Commission’s work has not yet started, it was stated that it must mandatorily participate, and an explanation was given that the people should not be held hostage.

When the Commission presented its six-month work report on Friday, February 6, 2018 to the Standing Committee on Democratic Affairs within the House of Representatives, this topic was the primary point of discussion. Although the institution had planned to complete the agenda collection work and enter into the main dialogue starting from January 2018, it mentioned that it has been difficult to state when the dialogue assembly would begin because work has not started in the Tigray region. Commissioner Zegeye Asfaw was one of the leaders of the institution who raised this extensively. He stated, “Do not rush us, lest we make it fruitless by hurrying.” Commissioner Zegeye, who stated that we should not present something flimsy by shortening the time for the results of the dialogue work which the people are awaiting with great hope, mentioned that identifying the collected agendas is itself a major problem and stated that “we have not even entered into it although we have prepared a procedure to identify agendas” as an additional reason for this stance.

The other commissioner, Ambassador Mahmoud Dirir, on his part, urged that the people should not be held hostage, citing the fact that work has not started in the Tigray region. In response to a question asked as to why the Commission does not conduct the agenda collection and subsequent works in a convenient place even if it is outside the region, the Chief Commissioner responded that this would not happen. He also said, “When will the dialogue end? It is not a process that is easily estimated or told.” He added by repeating what was said a year ago, asking how they can start in the coming months and stating that they seek the high assistance of the House.

The Commission identified and presented to the House the major problems it faced over the past years and four issues it stated are still testing it. The report distributed to the House indicates that the challenges the Commission stated it faced are primarily related to peace and security. The National Dialogue Commission explained in the report that it encountered fluctuating and demanding challenges during the agenda collection process. Stating that the work is full of many challenging conditions, the Commission said that particularly the impact of conflict is the foremost.

The second challenge the Commission stated it faced are questions raised in connection with independence and neutrality. It was also explained in the report that the distribution of distorted information regarding the independence and neutrality of the Commission is a major challenge. It also pointed out that the non-participation of some political parties in the dialogue process for their own reasons, as stated by the Commission, has been a challenge. The fourth challenge placed by the Commission is the lack of participation of armed groups.

The Commission announced in the report it presented to the House that the absence of enabling conditions to involve those in armed struggle has been a major challenge. Although the Commission expressed its readiness to enable armed groups to participate in the dialogue process, it stated that additional efforts are required from the government and armed groups to bring about concrete results.

What are the Criticisms?

The critical points we wish to summarize under this sub-heading, which we believe will be of value both to the House of Peoples’ Representatives; which oversees the Commission and to the Commission itself, are briefly raised as follows;

• Credibility and Neutrality: – It is observed being raised with suspicion by various competing parties and some analysts that some members of the Commission have links with the ruling Prosperity Party. The process by which the commissioners were selected is also questioned on the grounds that it lacked transparency and did not involve the opposition.
• Risk of Political Manipulation: – Accusations are heard that the Prosperity government is using the Commission as a tool to prolong its power and to secure international community support and loans.
• Attempt to Cover Up Crimes: – Strong criticism is also raised that the government is trying to use the dialogue as a pretext to cover up alleged war crimes and human rights violations committed in the Amhara, Tigray, and Wollega areas.
• Lack of Inclusivity: – There is a grievance that neither the government nor the Commission has made sufficient efforts to bring major political forces and armed groups, who are crucial for a meaningful peace process, into the dialogue.
• Focus on Technical Issues: – Voices are also heard stating that the Commission’s preoccupation with technical and procedural issues, rather than resolving the fundamental political problems that are the causes of conflicts, has put the sincerity of resolving the problem into question.

Bridge’s Recommendations

The challenges faced by the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission are not unique to Ethiopia. History shows that due to structural weaknesses, mistrust, and elite capture, national dialogues in other countries have repeatedly been driven to failure. In South Sudan’s peacebuilding process, the national dialogue that was hoped for was hindered due to the exclusion of elites, historical grievances, and ethnic division. On the other hand, the reconciliation that came after the war in Liberia remained only a negative peace; this became a reason for the delay of disarmament and for mistrust between the government and the opposition for the sake of political gain. Yemen, Chad, and Sri Lanka are also similar examples of failure.

These situations confirm one bitter truth: that even the most promising dialogues fail without inclusive representatives, without institutional independence, and without a neutral implementation system. In view of this, Bridge wishes to present the following points as recommendations. Before we move to the general recommendations, however, let us briefly mention the ideas we believe the House of Peoples’ Representatives should have on this topic:

As Bridge understands it, since the House of Peoples’ Representatives is the superior body that established the National Dialogue Commission by proclamation, it should have the following crucial roles for the process to be successful and gain trust;

• Monitoring and Oversight Role: – The House must monitor the Commission’s performance of its work with neutrality and inclusivity more closely than it has done so far; for the reason that the Commission’s periods from here on are extremely critical.
• Reviewing the Commission’s Performance Report: – We say that both the House and the relevant Standing Committee on Democratic Affairs, when reviewing the reports the Commission submits periodically, must exert pressure so that gaps in inclusivity observed during the preparation and process phases are corrected.
• The House of Peoples’ Representatives of the FDRE, as its primary existence is public representation, we say it must strive more than this to ensure without fail that the Commission is free from bias and is transparent to the public.
• It is known that the foremost of the challenges the Commission has repeatedly raised is the difficulty of involving armed forces; in view of this, if the House devises a way to grant legal immunity to the combatants, we believe it would enable the armed groups to participate in the dialogue without fear, and we wish to make a call based on our civic responsibility for this to be considered.

The other focus of our recommendation is the National Dialogue Commission itself, and as contributing a few ideas is our institutional responsibility, we believe the following points will ease the Commission’s remaining tasks if it considers them.

• Selection Strategy of Participants: – It is known that the selection strategy the Commission has followed until today is a bottom-up approach. Our institution has observed concerns that this selection strategy ignores the true causes of conflict and actors in various localities. There is a related concern that selecting participants starting from the Woreda level covers up horizontal conflicts and grudges between groups. Since this approach causes major conflict actors to be excluded, we say that if the Commission strives to adjust this institutional approach as much as possible in the remaining eight months, the benefit will be significant.
• Categorization of Society: – The way the Commission has categorized participants into nine sectors of society has similarly not escaped criticism. The reason is that it has not taken into account ethnic and religious identity, which are said to be the foundation of Ethiopia’s political crisis. Particularly, since Ethiopia’s fundamental problem is based on nationalism and identity competition, grouping participants only by profession or living condition ignores this basic problem. Thus, Bridge wishes to present its recommendation stating that if the Commission corrects this institutional distortion, it will have a positive contribution.
• Institutional Grievances: – Grievances from institutions are observed being raised; as an illustration, it is remembered that the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church submitted a grievance stating They have been marginalized. In view of this, it shows the Commission’s inability to involve identity groups such as religion and ethnicity as a collective entity; we say this should be considered, as if a condition is created where this is corrected, the public hope in the Commission will be grounded in reality.
• Not Omitting or Diluting Agendas: – Although the Commission has the legal power to organize agendas, it must ensure that agendas submitted by participants and various parties gain acceptance and are not improperly discarded; Bridge wishes to mention that if it performs this using official and public forum, it will raise the institution’s credibility, and thus it should be considered.

By presenting the points we have raised above as recommendations in the following short summary table, we wish to conclude this month’s Bridge Survey;

Area of Focus	Action to be Taken	Expected Result
Inclusivity	Fully engaging armed groups and excluded competing parties;	Ending the war and establishing broad political acceptance;
Transparency	Disclosing the list of participants, the agenda collection process, and the agendas in detail;	Increasing trust among the public and stakeholders;
Accountability	Reducing the government influence alleged by various parties and working to gain public approval for the existence of a neutral operation;	Making the dialogue results credible and implementable;