It is being reported that Ethiopia is on the finish line of World Trade Organization (WTO) accession; the final push for membership has also intensified. Since Ethiopia officially applied to join the WTO in 2003, it has gone through a lengthy 23-year journey, marked by stalling and restarting the negotiations. Following the political transition that took place eight years ago, as it accelerated its negotiation process, it is believed that its membership bid will be resolved by the middle of next year at the latest.

 It is well-known to be stipulated in the Constitution that the House of Peoples’ Representatives of Ethiopia is the legislative institution that scrutinizes in detail and approves numerous draft proclamations (Customs Proclamation Amendment, Business Licensing Service Fee Regulation, the Berne Convention and Copyright Protection Laws) coming in the wake of WTO membership. From this perspective, we will look below at the policy-oriented points that we believe the House should consider when it approves these international laws.

Prompted by the motive to expedite this membership request, it has been some time since the country began implementing various macroeconomic fundamental structural reforms. Among these, making the foreign exchange rate entirely determined by market forces, opening up the banking, telecom and logistics sectors to foreign competition, as well as executing legal and institutional reforms can be cited as its accomplished actions.

However, while the membership carries high hopes of bringing extensive market opportunities, foreign investment inflows, and technology transfer; it is also raised that it possesses its own structural challenges in light of the existential competition that domestic manufacturers, farmers, and financial institutions might face. In this regard, arguments are also heard that the experiences of Cambodia and Nepal, which went through the process in WTO history and became the only two Developing Countries (DCs)* to join, serve as tangible lessons for Ethiopia.

Even so, the day after the Ethiopian government negotiators returned from participating in the 14^th WTO Ministerial Conference held two weeks ago in Yaoundé, Cameroon, they were heard stating that the country has been increasingly meeting most of the criteria that qualify it for membership. It has also been reported that the membership issue is now on the finish line.

So, our institution, BRIDGE, leaning on this critical current membership update and citing the accession journey, has chosen to prepare this weekly review by intertwining the blessings brought and the challenges triggered by becoming a member of this global institution with the experiences of other similar developing countries and Ethiopia’s current government stance.

Return from Cameroon

Ethiopia’s long-term effort to become a member of the World Trade Organization has reached its final chapter, and high-ranking government officials and leaders of the international trade organization have hinted that the accession could be finalized within this calendar year.

The Governor of the National Bank, Dr. Eyob Tekalign, stated on his X page that Ethiopia is currently on the finish line of the accession process. The Governor expressed this based on the assurance given by the WTO Director-General, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, during the Ministerial Conference held in Cameroon. Okonjo-Iweala, in her speech at the 14^th WTO Ministerial Conference held in Cameroon late last month, specifically cited Ethiopia as one of the candidates that have reached an exceptionally advanced stage among the 22 countries seeking membership. Addressing the high-level country representatives present at the meeting, she stated: “Uzbekistan and Ethiopia are working extremely hard; we have high hopes that they will achieve membership this year.”

The WTO leader, in another X message following a discussion with the Minister of Trade and Regional Integration, Dr. Kasahun Gofe, and the Ethiopian negotiating team, also stated that Ethiopia is “making good progress” in its accession negotiations; adding that the Ministerial Conference is expected to further accelerate the process. This renewed momentum for Ethiopia comes at a time when more than 4,000 delegates representing 166 countries convened a conference in Yaoundé to deliberate on the reform of the multilateral trading system amid geopolitical tensions.

A Quarter-Century Journey

The aforementioned leader of the organization, Okonjo-Iweala, also referred to Ethiopia’s accession journey as “laborious” and commended accession-seeking countries like Ethiopia for their resilience. Indeed, Ethiopia’s path has likely been arduous.

The long diplomatic and legal journey Ethiopia has undertaken to become a member of the World Trade Organization is a historical process that vividly reflects the country’s political-economic ups and downs. After officially announcing its interest to join in 2003, the country attained candidacy or observer status within the organization and initiated its first formal chapter of negotiations. However, this process could not be finalized within a short period, unlike that of other developing countries. This delay in negotiations stemmed not only from a lack of technical capacity but also because the economic line pursued by the EPRDF-led “developmental state” in the country was in complete contradiction with the fundamental principles of the organization.

The former Ethiopian government considered retaining key strategic pillars of the economy under total state control; such as telecommunications, the financial sector (banking and insurance), and energy supply, as a manifestation of national security and sovereignty. For this reason, it spent years resisting demands presented by major Western trading partners (particularly the United States and the European Union) to open up the service sector to cross-border markets.

A major structural shift occurred in the negotiation process following the political transition of 2018. Aiming to address the country’s economic stagnation and foreign exchange shortages, the government unveiled the “Homegrown Economic Reform” policy. Since this macroeconomic reform paved the way to partially or fully open up strategic sectors to private and overseas investors; which were previously closed to cross-border business enterprises, it created a new alignment with the fundamental principles of the World Trade Organization.

Following this, by attending the Geneva meeting in 2020; known in the trade organization’s bureaucratic jargon as the fourth Working Party meeting, Ethiopia officially revitalized its trade diplomacy, which had been suspended for years. Although the conflict that erupted in the northern part of the country and the COVID-19 pandemic slowed down the process again for a few years, following the Pretoria Peace Agreement and subsequent sequential macroeconomic policy changes implemented thereafter, the negotiation process has entered a highly accelerated chapter from which there is no turning back.

Today

At present, Ethiopia has prepared detailed responses to hundreds of technical questions raised by WTO member countries and continues to submit them in rounds. Following the conclusion of the fifth Working Party meeting, the Ethiopian negotiating team is currently primarily focusing its efforts on bilateral market access negotiations. At this stage, it is raised that major trading partners such as the United States, the European Union, China, and India are exerting strong diplomatic pressure on Ethiopia to lower the maximum tariff ceilings it imposes on imported goods and to align its legal frameworks (such as copyright and competition laws) with international standards.

The radical policy measure taken by the Ethiopian government to let the foreign exchange rate be entirely determined by market forces has provided a direct response to a major bottleneck that had persisted for years on the WTO negotiation table. The previously existing restricted foreign exchange regime was in absolute conflict with the principles of free market and capital flow pursued by the organization. The implementation of this policy reform has enabled the Ethiopian negotiating team to transition from a slow-paced policy defense of gradual opening to a progressive liberalization of economic sectors. Since opening the foreign exchange market allows foreign investors to repatriate their profits to their home countries without any restrictions, it has established the primary legal and policy confidence for the success of the accession.

Another focus of the macroeconomic reform is the liberalization of the import and export trade sectors. Opening up the retail, wholesale trade, and logistics sectors; which were previously closed exclusively to domestic merchants, to foreign companies demonstrates the commitment to preemptively implement the institution’s principle of national treatment. Furthermore, it is increasingly heard that tasks regarding the revision of the commercial code, the enhancement of contract enforcement capacity, and the alignment of copyright protection laws with international standards are being executed rapidly.

In terms of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), although it is the most difficult part of the negotiation requiring the utmost caution, Ethiopia has accomplished notable policy changes in this regard as well. By opening up the telecom sector, permitting a second foreign operator (Safaricom) to enter, and offering a partial stake of Ethio Telecom to the market, it has caused the service sector to follow market principles for the first time in history.

More importantly, the new directive issued by the National Bank of Ethiopia, which permits foreign banks to operate domestically by opening branches or through mergers with local banks, has prepared Ethiopia’s financial sector for international competition. It is worth noting that this measure has removed a major policy hurdle that stood in the way of ratifying the trade agreement. This liberalization of the service sector possesses extensive opportunities to bring substantial foreign capital, modern banking technology, and an improved credit supply system into the country.

What Does the Current Government Stance Look Like?

We obtain the contemporary understanding of the Ethiopian government regarding the negotiations particularly from the interviews given by the Minister of Trade and Regional Integration, Dr. Kasahun Gofe, upon returning from the Yaoundé conference held a week ago. We can look at the summary of the Minister’s remarks briefly as follows.

As the Minister stated, because extensive effort and commitment were undertaken on the part of the government to elevate the process from a stalled stage to a revitalized one, a new negotiating team was established, enabling the fifth Working Party meeting to be conducted in Geneva a year ago today. This negotiating team is led by the Minister of Trade and Regional Integration as the chief negotiator, and a National Negotiating Committee composed of high-ranking officials who are members from various critical macroeconomic institutions; including the Governor of the National Bank, the Customs Commission, the Investment Commission, the Ministry of Justice, the Policy Studies Institute, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as a National Technical Committee, have been organized and operational for some time now.

When the team commenced its work, it entered with a plan to largely finalize the process within a short timeframe, even if concluding it completely might not be possible; accordingly, it is stated that it was possible to execute the fifth Working Party meeting in March 2025, the sixth Working Party meeting in September 2025, and the seventh Working Party meeting this past month of April. Since these three Working Party meetings were conducted within a one-year period (spanning less than 13 months in terms of months), this has been considered a highly rapid negotiation process. Dr. Kasahun was heard stating that during the execution of the aforementioned 14^th WTO Ministerial Conference in Yaoundé, Cameroon, recognition was given in the presence of global trade ministers to the political commitment of the Ethiopian government and the leadership of the negotiating team.

The participation observed at the seventh Working Party meeting reportedly demonstrates that the country’s negotiation report has progressively matured over time. It was noted that the greatest outcome presented at the sixth Working Party meeting was the phase where the report transitioned from substance into applicability. According to the Minister’s information, this draft document demonstrates a sufficient level of progress for ratification; currently, within the seventh Working Party report, a document has been prepared and evaluated that contains about 769 clauses, covers 400 pages, includes 52 annexed documents, presents nearly 419 legal frameworks, and incorporates 32 mandatory clauses.

The Minister raised in his interview that by participating in multilateral negotiations with these elements, Ethiopia’s accession journey was a platform where the content was evaluated more thoroughly than at any other time, actual substance was engaged, a better report was presented, and the attention of member countries was captured. Consequently, Dr. Kasahun raised that there was a situation where most member countries agreed that Ethiopia could finalize the process within this calendar year, and stated that although remaining issues are not absent, major decisions were made at the seventh meeting.

Among these, he stated that by amending the customs tariff valuation proclamation, an agreement was reached to eliminate other duties and charges starting from the time of accession. Furthermore, it is said that because the Franco Valuta payment directive was approved, an agreement was made to eliminate the cargo scanning fee, and matters raised as questions by many at this Working Party meeting were removed, greater confidence was created, and Ethiopia’s negotiation process directed itself toward what is described as a genuine level. Since discussions were held across all chapters and consensus was reached, and the number of remaining questions has been decreasing, an agreement has been made to conduct the eighth Working Party meeting this coming month of September, and to execute the tasks that must precede it prior to that time.

The second and main platform where WTO negotiations take place is what is known as the bilateral market access negotiations. In this regard, although 22 countries out of the 56 Working Party members had requested to negotiate bilaterally, as the process advanced and particularly because sufficient responses and explanations were provided on the multilateral platform during the fifth and sixth Working Party meetings; five countries dropped their requests, stating that the multilateral negotiation is sufficient, thereby reducing the number of negotiating countries to 17. Among these 17 countries, the bilateral market access negotiations with nine have been completely finalized, and the Minister was heard stating that negotiations with the remaining countries are in a good state.

What comprehensively shows us this accession process, which Ethiopia states it is finalizing, is when we look at the main points summarized from the two speeches delivered by the Minister, Dr. Kasahun, at that Yaoundé conference; in the current report the Minister presented to the conference, he told the attendees that his government is executing the following policy-related matters:

• Regarding the Franco Valuta System: – An independent directive that oversees and regulates Franco Valuta transactions has been prepared and put into operation;
• Regarding General Asset Data of Federal Public Enterprises: – The task of providing detailed comprehensive asset data of these institutions is currently under evaluation, and it will be finalized shortly and incorporated into the report;
• Regarding Business Licensing Service Fee Regulation: – The business licensing service fee regulation of the Ministry of Trade and Regional Integration has been re-evaluated, and a request has been submitted to the Council of Ministers for the draft regulation document to be approved;
• Regarding Cargo Scanning Fee: – A decision has been passed to completely eliminate the cargo scanning fee, which is levied based on product value, effective from July 2026;
• Regarding the Ban on Used Clothing: – The ban that had been imposed on the importation of used clothing has been lifted, and instead, a customs duty that will be applicable in a manner consistent with WTO provisions has been levied upon it;
• Regarding the Ban on Fuel Vehicles: – Concerning the import trade restriction imposed on fuel-powered automobiles and three-wheeled vehicles, it is stated that Ethiopia planned to pursue a similar policy direction before joining the organization; it was noted that the current restriction was made to continue temporarily due to the fuel supply shortage created in connection with the conflict in the Middle East;
• Regarding Advance Rulings on Rules of Origin: – A directive on advance rulings for rules of origin has been issued, and to make the procedure more transparent and predictable, official publication of these advance ruling outcomes via the internet has commenced;
• Regarding Customs Law Amendment: – The draft Customs Proclamation amendment, which is part of the customs law amendment agenda, is being deliberated upon by the House of Peoples’ Representatives;
• Regarding Ratification of the Berne Convention (Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works): – The draft law prepared to ratify the Berne Convention has been submitted to the Council of Ministers; as well as,
• Regarding the Complete Elimination of Other Duties and Charges: – Taking into account the concerns of member countries, and also recognizing that this matter had persisted as a major bottleneck in terms of delaying Ethiopia’s accession journey; the Ethiopian government has reached a decision to completely cancel any other duties and charges starting from the date the country becomes a member of the organization, these are the fundamental points.

What Should Ethiopia Learn?

The Asian Countries, * Nepal and Cambodia are the only Developing Countries (LDCs) that have passed through the negotiation and membership preparation process to join the World Trade Organization. These countries faced numerous challenges during their accession journeys; essays written regarding the membership intricacies of the countries state that the primary reasons for this were a lack of technical support and a deficiency in negotiating capacity. 

Consequently, they were forced to accept highly onerous negotiation terms that exceeded their own capacities and even surpassed the criteria strictly set as mandatory by the World Trade Organization itself. Since Ethiopia is also currently a developing country in the process of joining the organization, it is reasonable to assume that it could encounter the obstacles previously faced by Cambodia and Nepal. Therefore, the experiences of these countries will greatly assist Ethiopia in avoiding the repetition of easily preventable mistakes during its membership and implementation processes. Let us raise a few points derived from the accession journeys, agreement documents, and practical experiences of the two countries, which would be of value if Ethiopia considers them properly;-

A: Prolonged Negotiations and Bilateral Challenges;

Since Article 12 of the Marrakesh Agreement* does not lay down explicit guidelines regarding the terms to be reached between an acceding country and the organization, it has been demonstrated by the experiences of these countries that the membership process is highly challenging and protracted. Although WTO members promised to ease and expedite the negotiation process for developing countries, in practice, Nepal and Cambodia were made to pass through complex negotiation stages just like any other developed countries.

Furthermore, because the economically developed member countries that were already within the organization presented highly stringent and demanding requests during the bilateral negotiation phase, both countries faced immense challenges particularly at this specific stage.

B: The Impact of Global Institutional Obligations and Capacity Asymmetry;

The binding terms both countries were requested to enter clearly demonstrated that developed member countries of the organization tend to impose obligations on developing countries that go beyond the standard rules of the organization. During the negotiations, Cambodia and Nepal were requested to accept terms that were disproportionate to their economic growth, capacities, as well as their trade and financial needs.

Although a principle has been established stating that existing members should refrain from seeking concessions and obligations on the trade of goods and services from developing countries undergoing the accession process, the obligations of both countries were highly stringent compared to existing developing members and even to some developing and developed countries. This demonstrates that the WTO membership process is based on supremacy of capacity and leverage, and that the practice diverges from the theory. In practice, since acceding countries are outside the system and possess no role whatsoever in formulating the rules, circumstances have forced the process to be largely driven by unilateral interests alone.

C: Post-Agreement Technical Support and the Necessity of a Monitoring Framework;

Although the technical support both countries received after becoming members of the organization was insufficient, the support they received during the accession process was highly essential for preparing complex documents and building capacity. However, due to the lack of sufficient technical support after becoming members, the countries were unable to achieve the benefits they ought to have derived from membership, particularly key policy goals such as diversifying and expanding export trade.

In addition to this insufficient technical support, the absence of an implementation monitoring framework and enforcement deadlines caused their pace of implementation to slow down, despite the immense efforts the countries made to implement the obligations imposed upon them in a timely and efficient manner. Therefore, it can be realized from the experiences of the countries that technical support is critical for developing nations not only during membership negotiations but also to practically translate entered commitments and to realize the benefits derived from membership.

D: Stakeholder Participation and Differences in Negotiation Strategy;

As the agreement documents of the countries show, Cambodia agreed to accept terms that were more laborious and onerous; whereas Nepal was relatively able to negotiate better and more favorable membership terms. The reason Nepal was able to be more successful than Cambodia was due to the technical support it received during the negotiations and, above all, the presence of stakeholder participation in the negotiation process. In Nepal’s case, even though most stakeholders believed they were excluded from the process, policy analyses and discussion forums provided by civil society groups enabled the Nepalese government to avoid accepting highly onerous obligations on certain matters. However, a gap was created because the relationship between the government and stakeholders did not continue after membership was verified. Therefore, it can be learned that the active participation of stakeholders is highly critical in the accession journey of developing countries to withstand the stringent and binding demands presented by existing member countries.

Hopes and Challenges

Like any other developing country, varied hopes and challenges await Ethiopia as well in the success of the WTO accession journey it has initiated. Even so, since all countries do not face the identical type of hopes and challenges, looking at the challenges that might confront Ethiopia and the opportunities that could come from the perspective of its own internal socio-economic and political context starting from now cannot be denied to be useful in accelerating institutional readiness; hence, we believe it is valuable to raise a few points around these two upcoming scenarios.

What are the Blessings?

According to economic experts, if Ethiopia joins the World Trade Organization, it will obtain extensive market opportunities; particularly, while the accession is not new in terms of reducing export tariffs for agricultural products, for which the country is better known, it will create a major market opportunity. In connection with this, commercial law and policy experts also explain that opening the market to member countries grants an opportunity to sell commodities without tariffs and opens the door to supply products such as coffee to the global market without restrictions by removing trade barriers such as tariffs.

The researchers explain that non-tariff obligations, which have been a challenge for many African business enterprises to enter platforms such as the European market, will be removed by agreement, and this will create a major market opportunity. Another hope is attracting foreign investment; it is believed that the country’s electric power, labor costs, and land being cheap, as well as the country possessing the membership guarantee, will be a major capacity to convince foreign investors.

While it is cited that competition leads to a better economic system, it is also raised that the old practice which kept the domestic market protected from foreign competition was not viable and led the government toward a free market. Writers who support Ethiopia’s membership bid argue that entering competition possesses its own major significance since the organization serves as a learning tool; the process is also expected to interconnect the country’s businesses with regional and international value chains.

Basing on this very benefit and hope, high hopes are also held that Ethiopia’s becoming a member of the World Trade Organization will yield numerous benefits across various specific economic sectors. In terms of the service sector, services play a critical role in the economic growth of developing countries; for instance, it is known that the contribution services make to the total Gross Domestic Product is usually around 40 percent.

From this perspective, the country’s following principles such as most-favored-nation treatment or, in the nomenclature of the trade organization, national treatment within the service sector will yield numerous rewards. Among these, enhancing domestic competition and improving service quality, widely obtaining new service lines and realizing rapid service delivery, establishing better credit rating systems, expanding product choices and the number of suppliers, easing risk-diversification channels, strengthening the role of financial intermediation, as well as accelerating knowledge and technology transfer are principally mentioned.

 

Additionally, the country can benefit from special treatments accorded to developing countries under Article 19 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, as well as negotiated operational strategies that enable opening only a few sectors and liberalizing only specific trade exchanges for the market. Therefore, it is believed that a cautious and cost-effective approach toward service sector reform aligns with the country’s development goals; these grants its convenient flexibility to open its service sectors and expand its market opportunities according to its specific needs.

In a similar manner, when viewed from the perspective of investment sector opportunities, WTO membership creates a major opportunity to attract foreign investment inflows, which are considered the primary engine of economic growth. This is because membership offers assurances and political commitments that attract the interest of investors, such as property rights protection and political stability. Becoming a member of the organization guarantees an open and transparent market with clear trade policies and provides a reliable legal framework for investors; this creates favorable conditions for foreign investment inflows.

In general, because WTO membership creates a stable and open policy environment, it substantially attracts investment inflows; it also causes investors to trust the commitment the country has toward an open and stable policy regime. Furthermore, international agreements such as Trade-Related Investment Measures and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights provide major support for the country to register long-term economic growth by encouraging technology acquisition and protecting intellectual property; such are the arguments of the supporters of the membership bid.

Challenges

On the other hand, as other economic experts state, the membership brings with it numerous structural challenges and obligations; the greatest challenge is that the country is forced to reduce subsidies it provides to strengthen the competitiveness of farmers and producers, because other member countries consider subsidies as distorting the competitive arena and possess procedures to prohibit them. Beyond this, some economic experts explain that weaknesses in the country’s legal framework, the intellectual property rights protection system, as well as the absence of a politically independent, predictable judiciary and dispute settlement system raise questions regarding Ethiopia’s ability to benefit.

They also caution that international assurances given for non-trade issues, such as political movements, are still non-existent in Ethiopia, and that it is impossible to be certain whether Ethiopian enterprises, producers, and farmers can maintain their survival within this open competition. Commercial law experts, for their part, state that what makes the process challenging is the bilateral negotiations conducted with economically developed nations that have interests in the Ethiopian market, such as the United States and the United Kingdom; they explain that the pressure these countries exert to open closed sectors, including insurance, to reduce tariffs, and to eliminate discriminatory practices favoring domestic industries will demand additional time-consuming legal and institutional reforms.

On the other hand, analysts who argue that reducing tariffs levied on imported goods will inevitably create a certain amount of pressure on the government’s direct revenue source state that, beyond this, the market competition the nascent domestic manufacturing sector will have with cheap and quality-assured international products will not only weaken domestic producers but that the number of experts who harbor fears of it creating a phenomenon known as the swallowing of infant industries is by no means small. Above all, however, at this hour when the global trading system is under pressure and the very existence and enforcement capacity of the institution itself has been called into question, a strong apprehension is heard that the movement to become a member outweighs its benefits.

BRIDGE’s Recommendations

Anchored on the experiences of the two developing countries we mentioned above and a substantial number of studies written on the matter and although it is stated that the negotiations are at the finish line, membership is realized only when all WTO members agree by full consensus; we desire to raise the points that we believe Ethiopian negotiators ought to look at calmly during subsequent negotiations.

The experience of those Asian countries properly demonstrates that Ethiopia must absolutely never agree to accept obligations and terms that are more onerous than those accepted particularly by the developing countries that were founders of the World Trade Organization. To fully realize the benefits derived from membership, the country must also formulate explicitly stated and distinct accession goals.

As can be understood from the experiences of Cambodia and Nepal, since membership negotiations are executed on a bilateral platform and are ultimately ratified as binding law upon the acceding country, Ethiopia must map out clear negotiating goals regarding the trade of goods, trade in services, and intellectual property rights. Within this process, the country must strive to safeguard concessions and rights that take into account its own specific needs and are proportionate to its capacity.

It is the belief of BRIDGE that if the negotiating team, which incorporates Ethiopia’s primary economic decision-making federal institutions, conducts strong negotiations particularly on the following points, it appears possible to survive the coming challenge:-

A: Negotiating Higher Tariff Ceilings;

As the experiences of existing member countries show, since tariffs can serve as a highly essential fiscal policy tool, Ethiopia must ensure that its tariff ceilings are set substantially higher than the tariff rates currently in practice. Since this mechanism also serves as a primary source of revenue for developing countries like Ethiopia, it must strive to negotiate the country’s tariff ceilings to be higher than the rates of Nepal and Cambodia. Additionally, we argue that it ought to apply high tariff ceilings for sensitive domestic sub-economic sectors.

B: Securing Long Transition Periods;

It is necessary to negotiate to obtain long transition periods that enable the step-by-step implementation of membership obligations into practice. For example, it must ensure obtaining a sufficient transition period to implement the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (such as, for instance, the type of transition period that existed until 2016 regarding patent protection for pharmaceutical products).

C: Utilizing Special and Differential Treatments Appropriately;

We also desire to remind that the structural arrangements permitted for developing countries, known as Special and Differential Treatment, ought to be utilized to a high degree. For example, it must fight firmly to safeguard its right to provide subsidies to the agricultural sector. In view of the massive share the agricultural sector holds within the country’s economy, particularly its irreplaceable role in human development, food security, and rural development, Ethiopia must not be requested to enter into stringent obligations regarding subsidies and tariffs.

Rather, when it becomes necessary, it must continue by maintaining policy flexibility in terms of tariffs, domestic support, and subsidies. From this perspective, although Cambodia was unable to continue maintaining its agricultural subsidies, Nepal was able to safeguard this right through negotiation; we wish to remind that this is an experience the Ethiopian negotiators ought to take note of.

In this manner, and in light of the exploratory observations of BRIDGE presented above, since the primary focus of our Endrasie publication is the Ethiopian house of people representatives, we desire to briefly raise the recommendations we believe will be beneficial both for the outgoing MP’s and for those coming following the next election. In view of the structural policy changes raised in our assessment, the experiences of developing countries (particularly Nepal and Cambodia), as well as the bilateral and multilateral negotiating obligations the country has entered into, we strongly urge the MP’s to look closely at these recommendatory points: –

A: As stipulated in the country’s Constitution, the House of Ethiopian people’s house of Representatives is the legislative institution that scrutinizes in detail and approves numerous draft proclamations (Customs Proclamation Amendment, Business Licensing Service Fee Regulation, the Berne Convention, and Copyright Protection Laws) coming in the wake of WTO membership. Thus, when the House ratifies these international laws, we argue it must ensure not only that the legal frameworks align with the global organization’s criteria, but that it incorporates national safety nets into the law to prevent nascent domestic industries, small-scale producers, and farmers from being swallowed by unrestricted competition with cheap and quality-assured imported products.

B: As seen from the experiences of Cambodia and Nepal, a severe economic crisis was observed to break out when developing countries were forced to implement negotiation terms that exceeded their capacities within a short timeframe. From this perspective, when the House evaluates the agreement documents submitted to it by the negotiating team, it is worth reminding that it must exert high pressure to ensure that long transition periods enabling the country to adjust step-by-step are incorporated into the agreement, particularly regarding sensitive economic sectors (such as finance, insurance, and intellectual property rights), and that this be ratified at the legal level.

C: As a substantial number of studies written on the subject warn, since agriculture holds an irreplaceable role in the country’s economy, food security, and rural development, the mandatory subsidy reductions imposed by the organization could trigger an irreversible national disaster. Thus, both the outgoing and incoming MP’s, basing on the successful negotiation experience of Nepal, must exert pressure before it is too late to ensure that the government firmly safeguards its right to provide domestic support and subsidies to the agricultural sector on the negotiation table. We also state that it must closely oversee that the fiscal policy right to set high tariff ceilings for sensitive domestic sub-economic sectors is protected.

D: It is necessary not to overlook that ensuring the active participation of stakeholders and civil society in the negotiation process is an activity that cannot be left for tomorrow. This is because the success observed in Nepal’s case was due to civil society groups and policy analysts participating actively and enabling the government to avoid accepting highly onerous obligations. The House of Representatives, being a platform for public outreach and dialogue, bears the responsibility to organize extensive public consultation forums participating domestic chambers of commerce, industrial associations, civil society organizations, and economic scholars before membership is ratified. Since this will enable the negotiating team to negotiate with strength by carrying the collective concerns and goals of the public and stakeholders, we argue it should be considered starting from now.

E: It is a widely written subject that the greatest mistake of Cambodia and Nepal was the lack of an implementation monitoring framework and technical support to efficiently implement obligations and realize benefits (such as expanding export trade) after becoming members. In light of this tangible experience, if the House, through its relevant standing committees, establishes an independent standing committee of the House that periodically evaluates the mandatory clauses Ethiopia will implement after becoming a member and the pace of implementation of these clauses; ensuring that the benefits expected from membership are translated into practice, which could perhaps be named, in the belief of BRIDGE, the “Post-Accession National Monitoring and Evaluation Framework”; it will serve as a proper institutional solution to share the benefits of membership as well as to surmount its challenges; hence, we desire that it be considered.

*Within the country classification of the World Trade Organization, the designation of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) is applied to other Latin and Asian countries, including Ethiopia. According to the institution’s definition, such countries are those characterized by low economic growth, underdeveloped human resource development, and high vulnerability to both natural and economic crises. Even so, scholars from the Global South who critique this institution and its foundational pillars argue that this classification is not merely an objective economic designation; rather, it is a human-made structure embedded with historical foundations and the politics of power hegemony.

This classification is frequently criticized for reflecting historical colonial legacies, establishing Western development criteria as the sole path forward, and further reinforcing global inequality through hierarchical branding. These scholars contend that the definition of “development” entangled within this “Least Developed Countries” framework excludes alternative socio-economic realities and perpetuates a narrative structure that brands certain countries as inherently deficient within the international system. It is worth noting that our use of the designation “developing country” alone is guided by the spirit of this intellectual discourse from the Global South.

*The Marrakesh Agreement refers to the international treaty signed on April 15, 1994, in Marrakesh, Morocco, which heralded the establishment of the World Trade Organization. The agreement has also become a historic document that created a common framework enabling nations to conduct international trade with freedom, transparency, and fairness. However, the term internationally encompasses another treaty otherwise known as the Marrakesh Treaty; signed in 2013 under the World Intellectual Property Organization, which enables individuals who are blind, visually impaired, or otherwise print-disabled to easily access and internationally exchange books produced in accessible formats such as Braille, audio, and digital without being restricted by copyright law. It is worth recalling that Ethiopia has ratified only the latter agreement.