The Trajectory of Civil Society and Future Opportunities
One of the constitutional responsibilities carried out by the Ethiopian House of Peoples’ Representatives during the month of Miyazia was evaluating the performance of federal institutions for this budget year. Among the institutions summoned to the hall of the representatives to present their nine-month performance reports, the Authority for Civil Society Organizations (ACSO) was at the forefront in terms of time allocation.
As reported, the Standing Committee on Legal and Justice Affairs of the House of Peoples’ Representatives listened to the institution’s report. The Authority presented a report focused on civil society operations, the organization registration process, the utilization of association funds, and preparations for the upcoming election.
Since the role of civil society is paramount for the 7th National Election to be peaceful, fair and credible, it was reported that a strong directive was issued by the Standing Committee to the Authority to ensure that capacity building work for organizations working on election-related issues continues strengthened, and that strict monitoring be conducted so that these organizations operate independently and neutrally without falling under the influence of any party.
Based on this premise, our institution, BRIDGE, presents this weekly Insight by briefly exploring the trajectory of civil society; its journey through the three regimes as well as its current holistic landscape, and by offering related institutional recommendations.
1. When they say Civil Society…
The definition provided for What is Civil Society? reflects significant variations in scholarly discourse. Diverse perspectives are also observed regarding the roles they play within a community. Until the 18th century, civil society was a term used interchangeably with the state. Among the seminal thinkers, the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was the first to argue for a distinction between civil society and the state. For him, civil society is an institution that stands between the family and the state, created by citizens who feel marginalized by the political society to protect their interests and gain recognition.
Karl Marx, who in his formative years leaned toward Hegel but viewed all phenomena through the lens of class struggle, seemed to agree with Hegel’s definition to some extent. However, as with everything else, he presented civil society as an arena where individual interests and class-based demands are contested and where the outcome of this struggle plays a role in overthrowing the central government through revolution.
The perspective of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci is considered superior to Marx’s definition of ‘extracting the state from society.’ According to Gramsci’s view, as he wrote in his collection of essays ‘The Prison Notebooks,’ civil society should be defined as a collective of institutions, such as religious organizations, political parties, professional associations, and educational institutions, through which citizens represent themselves and their ideas thereof.
Although the specific criteria to be used remain a source of difference among scholars and civil society actors, the consensus view suggests that institutions organized by the full voluntarism of citizens, outside the state apparatus and without a profit-making motive, can be designated by this name. This definition encompasses various indigenous or externally supported institutions that strive to fulfill the interests of their founding citizens through legal means, seek to influence government policies, and exert a positive impact on socio-economic development, the expansion of the political space, and the building of democratic institutions.
Scholars writing on the acceleration of the democratic process and the role of civil society argue that there is a direct correlation between the two. A strong civil society has the capacity to foster the expansion of pluralism and ensure that democratic values are entrenched within the country’s institutions. They also make a significant contribution to achieving social justice by representing marginalized segments of society whose voices have been suppressed. These institutions possess institutional characteristics that allow them to monitor the political system according to its laws, curb the expansion of corruption, encourage transparency in governmental decision-making, and facilitate conditions that increase citizens’ political participation. Among many writers, the proliferation of such institutions signifies the strengthening of democratic processes, while conversely, the weakening of these organizations, as clearly evidenced by at least the past three decades, indicates the entrenchment of an authoritarian political system.
2. The Imperial Era
The civil society movement during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie was a period of transition from traditional and community-based self-help associations to modern and formal organizations. However, much has been written about how the overall landscape fell under the palm of the Emperor and was subject to strict control.
For centuries, Ethiopia has maintained strong traditional civic institutions, among which Iddir, Equb, and Debo are notable examples. In the 1950s and early 1960s, however, modern civil society organizations, including labor unions, other professional associations, and charitable organizations, began to emerge. These formal organizations were registered under the Ministry of Interior in accordance with Proclamation No. 321/1959.
The Emperor’s policies of modernization and the expansion of education helped create the educated workforce and the middle class that formed the foundation for the creation of civil societies. Among these scholars of the era, a movement emerged that followed Japan’s lead and strove to modernize the country. At the end of the reign, however, a radical student movement emerged, advocating land tenure reform and the establishment of democracy; it was in open opposition to the regime. Additionally, the drought and famine that occurred in 1966 did more than expose the government’s weaknesses; they led to the establishment of early relief organizations such as the Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA).
Even though modern civil societies were created in this manner, their ability to operate freely was limited, as the government exercised strict oversight over them. Just as political parties and overt protests were banned, the fate of other indigenous civil societies that were striving to become institutionalized was the same. Even those civil society structures that did emerge mostly benefited the urban dweller rather than the farmer. This voluntary movement, which began under the Emperor, was completely transformed following the 1966 revolution by the Derg regime, in which independent associations were replaced by government-led mass organizations.
3. Derg:- The Anti-Civil Society regime
The Derg, which ruled Ethiopia from 1966 to 1983, was known for widespread political oppression and strict control imposed on civil society. It is recalled that the military government, led by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, implemented a socialist ideology based on leftist principles. Although the regime aspired to create a society with economic equality by transferring land and industries to state ownership, its policies instead led to economic collapse, food shortages, and severe poverty. This sparked significant grievance among the populace and later ignited armed struggle.
During this era, the civil society movement was paralyzed due to the extreme restrictions and repression it faced from the government. By banning civil society organizations, the Derg imposed strict control over public gatherings, the media, and dissident voices. Human rights violations were widespread, with citizens suspected of opposing the regime subjected to beatings, extrajudicial killings, and forced disappearances.
Active civil society actors from the Imperial era, such as student groups, labor unions, and religious organizations, faced immense persecution and suffering. Numerous civic leaders were imprisoned, killed, or forced into exile. This repression weakened the capacity of civil society to the point where it became impossible to challenge the regime through peaceful means. Beyond leaving deep scars on Ethiopia’s social fabric, this era of oppression caused a long-lasting climate of fear and lack of trust even after the fall of the regime.
By dismantling independent civil societies, the Derg established mass organizations led by the government and the party (WPE) in their place. Among these were the Revolutionary Ethiopia Youth Association (REYA), the Revolutionary Ethiopia Women’s Association (REWA) and the All-Ethiopia Trade Union (AETU).
However, the establishment of these organizations was not intended to reflect the interests of citizens but rather to serve as appendages for controlling society, conducting military mobilization, and executing government policies; recall that even membership was mandatory. In this manner, even traditional institutions like Iddir, which the Emperor had left untouched, were utilized for political purposes during the Derg era. Beyond burial and social support, Iddirs’ were pressured to serve as conduits for government messages and even as tools for monitoring dissenters.
The only civil society movement that could be considered somewhat independent during the Derg era was seen in the humanitarian aid sector. Especially during the catastrophic famine of 1977, as the government was forced to accept international aid, it permitted numerous international non-governmental organizations to enter the country. This laid the foundation for the history of modern and aid-dependent Ethiopian NGOs. However, because their activities were restricted to hunger and food support, and they were strictly prohibited from participating in politics and human rights, it stunted the growth of a modern civil society that Ethiopia could have achieved.
4. The Three Phases of EPRDF
Following the end of the Cold War, the global community was compelled to view the world through the lens of liberal values. Consequently, the rulers who came to power during that era were forced to accept the role of civil societies, which is one of the pillars of a liberal political system. This is exactly what happened in Ethiopia: the EPRDF, which came to power following the fall of the Derg, had no alternative in the era but to accept the democratic role of civil society. Primarily due to this external pressure, a period that is remembered positively in the history of Ethiopian civil societies commenced. From this perspective, looking extensively at the various facets of this era will likely provide a broader picture for the subsequent period we are currently in.
Analysts who have studied the subject argue that the relationship EPRDF had with civil society consisted of three phases. These writers call the first phase the era overshadowed by cloudy hostility, which encompasses the process between the Front and civil society that lasted until the beginning of the Ethio-Eritrean war in 1993. They note that this is linked to the character the party exhibited from its armed struggle history. As a guerrilla insurgent group and a front that tuned its ideology with leftist teachings, it viewed independent institutions with high suspicion. Even in the years following its seizure of power, it did not detach itself from this spirit of suspicion. Although some non-governmental organizations had been providing support to the party during the armed struggle, its perception of organizations outside of its control as forces competing for power was one of the primary reasons for the low number of NGOs at the time. It appears to be this suspicious approach of the party that is frequently cited as a point of argument for why the opportunity for the number of NGOs to increase in Ethiopia; as happened in other African countries after the end of the Cold War, remained narrow.
The second phase raised by researchers is the one they labeled as Slow, which encompasses the period from the late 1980s to the post-1997election. In this phase, which the writers called Slow, the interaction of civil society with the government exhibited three fundamental facets.
The first facet was the increase in the number of organizations and the diversity of the sectors in which they were engaged. During this time, NGOs moved beyond traditional relief and development work and began to emerge extensively into the public square in areas of human rights protection, democratic building and good governance. This opened the way for civil society to begin gaining recognition as an independent systemic actor and a force for change.
The second facet was the participative inclination observed in policy formulation and decision-making processes. During this period, a high level of interest was observed on the part of the central government to include the voice and input of civil society in national policies such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy. This granted organizations the opportunity to use their proximity to the people to challenge the government’s development directions and present alternative ideas. This, in turn, sparked hope for a transition to a formal culture of consultation by easing the long-standing suspicion that existed between the two entities.
The third facet of this phase was the structural linkage created between the House of Peoples’ Representatives and representatives of civil society. During this time, a formal communication agreement was made between members of the House and NGOs, which enabled civil societies to participate in the House’s legislative drafting process and provide professional support through standing committees. Although this relationship was severed following the 1997 election, it provided a rare and historical opportunity; one not repeated since, for a few NGOs to lobby the government and influence the law-making process.
It is also imperative to look at the perspective through which the ruling party evaluated the country’s political system following the post-1997 election. During this period, referred to as the third phase, after the party failed to achieve its expected election results, it was led to the conviction that the NGOs; which it had previously permitted to educate voters and evaluate the election out of its own goodwill; had “worked with the opposition.”
The publication titled “The Struggle to Build a Democratic System,” published by the party in 1999, provides a partial view of how it perceived the NGOs. In this text, which many analysts called an irrational and empty rhetoric, the party analyzes ‘rent-seeking’; according to the party’s argument, using power for personal gain and allocating institutional income for matters it termed non-developmental were presented as manifestations of rent-seeking. This same document, which accuses NGOs of utilizing financial sources coming from ‘rent-seeking’ governments or of standing only to protect the interests of the organizations’ top leadership, curses the institutions, claiming they are “rent-seekers” by their very nature.
The ruling party, believing that systems of thought outside the ideology of Revolutionary Democracy would have no useful contribution to the country’s development or the building of democratic institutions, viewed institutions engaged in good governance, human rights protection and the provision of alternative policy ideas as entities challenging the party’s dream of omnipresence and total control; this compelled it to enact laws following the post-1997 election that undermined the spirit of the Constitution.
To put it briefly, the party understood civil societies as entities that should serve as instruments for political indoctrination and propaganda to maintain the supremacy of Revolutionary Democracy. Outside of this view, it caused civil societies, which were committed to the institutional vision for which they were established, to vanish from the public square, through both repressive laws and the political and security apparatus. As many who have studied the matter point out, one of the events that birthed the system change in 2010 was the crushing of the promising growth of civil society in this manner, which facilitated the ignition of the observed popular uprising.
In general, while the Imperial era was a time when the foundations of modern civil societies were laid and guided by state-led modernization, the Derg era was a dark period in which power was concentrated in a single center, and the flicker of independent civil society movements was extinguished. The subsequent post-Derg era, upon which much hope was placed, was marred by the EPRDF’s longing for totalitarianism.
This brief historical process shows that the fate of civil society in Ethiopia has always had a direct correlation with the nature of the political system. Based on these historical facts, we believe that looking at the current Prosperity-era landscape in comparison will provide a valuable lesson for our democratic journey tomorrow.
5. The Establishment of the Authority
Following the fall of the Derg government, from 1983 to 1987, it was the government institution known as the Ministry of Interior that held the power and function of registering associations. In 1987, through Proclamation No. 4/1987, which established executive bodies, the FDRE Ministry of Justice was legally granted the power and function to register religious organizations, non-profit organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and associations. Subsequently, as Proclamation No. 471/1998 continued to grant the Ministry of Justice the same power to register associations and religious organizations, the Ministry of Justice continued to perform the registration work until 2001.
Based on the Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) study conducted by the Ministry of Justice in 1999 and taking into account the growth recorded in the sector, an independent government executive body named the Charities and Societies Agency was established through Proclamation No. 621/2001 to enable the registration and administration of associations and non-profit organizations, excluding religious organizations. Although it operated with the mission of ensuring the greater benefit of the public by registering, licensing, monitoring, and supporting charities and societies to play their part in the country’s holistic growth, development, and democratic system building according to Proclamation No. 621/2001, it has been estimated by the government that it did not adequately fulfill its mission as it did not fully respect the right to organize and had numerous gaps in its execution.
In particular, because the proclamation restricted the scope of activities and income sources of organizations and associations, it was a proclamation against which significant grievances were filed. Therefore, following the change that came at the national level, as it was believed that the proclamation administering the sector and its execution had gaps, Proclamation No. 621/2001 was completely repealed and replaced by the new Proclamation No. 1113/2011. The Authority was then reorganized and established through Proclamation No. 1113/2011 as a federal government office with its own legal personality.
6. Has Hope Faded?
The coming to power of the Prosperity Party was an event that brought a historical transition to the landscape of civil society in Ethiopia. The legal reforms and democratic hopes initially undertaken by the government created strong motivation among actors in the sector to work closely with the government and bring about extensive changes. Civil society organizations began to play significant roles in expanding democratic values, advocating for human rights, and providing basic services to marginalized communities.
In particular, as the proclamation issued in 2019 No. 1113/2011) lifted the restrictions previously placed on foreign financial support, it enabled organizations working on human rights and peacebuilding to revive. Consequently, between 2011 and 2014 alone, nearly 250 new peacebuilding organizations were established, demonstrating their partnership in the building of democracy.
Currently, of the 4,938 organizations registered with the Authority for Civil Society Organizations, more than 4,395 are indigenous organizations, while the remaining 543 are foreign organizations. The Authority’s website indicates that more than 415 civil society organizations are professional associations organized based on various professions, and more than 165 civil society organizations are organizations working for persons with disabilities. These organizations range from small indigenous associations to international institutions, which shows the existence of diverse work approaches in civil society movements, from the grassroots level of society to broad international cooperation.
Furthermore, several organizations focusing on human rights and development, as well as organizations focusing on women’s issues, are engaged in their chosen civil society activities. BRIDGE has been able to understand through its brief assessment that these organizations often address social, economic, gender, and human rights issues related to conflicts. This indicates that peacebuilding work is a holistic task that includes ensuring the protection of human rights and sustainable development beyond just preventing conflicts.
7. A Few Points from the Authority’s Reports
As we mentioned in our introduction, since the basis for this assessment is the nine-month performance report of the FDRE Authority for Civil Society Organizations for this budget year, it is beneficial to look at the key points from this institutional report. It has been reported that the Authority stated that civil society organizations receive registration licenses only after their requests are examined in terms of national security. The Authority announced that it grants licenses to organizations applying for registration after carefully reviewing the matters in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Intelligence and Security Service, particularly from the perspective of national security.
Mrs. Kalkidan Mengiste, the Strategic Affairs Lead Executive of the Authority, who presented the nine-month performance report to the Standing Committee on Legal and Justice Affairs of the House of Peoples’ Representatives, reportedly stated that certificates are issued to organizations as long as they fulfill the necessary criteria. Accordingly, in the past nine months, 209 organizations received certificates of recognition, and it was noted that among these, 199 are foreign organizations. Furthermore, the Deputy Director General, Fasika Molla, stated that nearly 600 organizations have not re-registered since the issuance of the new proclamation and whose addresses are unknown; it was indicated that these organizations have lost their legal personality. It was also explained that the limited assets found among these organizations have been transferred to other organizations or to the Civil Society Fund in accordance with the law.
On her part, the Honorable Mrs. Etsegenet Mengistu, Chairperson of the Standing Committee, noted that even though the democratic space has been expanded, since not every organization comes with a healthy mindset, rigorous vetting and strict caution during the registration process must be carried out with focus.
On the other hand, while it was mentioned that among 485 organizations that applied for a license, some had their requests terminated or canceled due to failure to meet the criteria and lack of necessary follow-up, it was stated that 319 organizations are currently in the registration process. Regarding the question raised by the Standing Committee concerning the low number of registered organizations, the Director General of the Authority, Samson Biratu, provided a response. Mentioning that the right of any citizen to organize and register is permitted both by the Constitution and the Authority’s proclamation, the Director explained that certain matters are nonetheless viewed deeply from the perspective of national security. The Director announced that, particularly when they are foreign organizations, work is carried out to study their background in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Intelligence and Security Service.
Furthermore, it was stated that the Authority exercises strict control to ensure that the resources obtained by civil society organizations for the services they provide are used only for the intended purpose. Fasika Molla further explained that this control is evaluated through the reports the organizations submit annually in terms of their resource utilization, and appropriate feedback is provided.
Another core issue mentioned in this same report of the Authority was regarding the role civil society organizations are said to have in the upcoming election. According to information obtained from the House, it was noted that the Standing Committee urged that no questions should be raised regarding the independence and neutrality of the activities of indigenous civil society organizations participating in the seventh national election.
The Standing Committee stated that it is necessary to ensure that the organizations exercise strong control over their use of resources only for the purpose for which they were organized. It was reported that it was the Deputy Director of the Authority, Fasika Molla, who mentioned that currently, 212 indigenous civil society organizations have obtained licenses from the National Election Board of Ethiopia to participate in the election process; it was indicated that this shows a more revitalized movement compared to the sixth national election.
It was also reported that the Standing Committee emphasized that the neutrality of organizations participating in voter education and observation processes is extremely crucial. It urged the Authority to monitor the organizations to ensure they support the election neutrally and do not engage in unnecessary activities.
In light of the hold-and-release interaction between the three regimes and civil society that we have briefly seen above, arguments are heard suggesting that the current movement of associations seems better in comparison. That being said, regarding the upcoming 2018 election, by first mentioning what national responsibilities the current civil societies have, we shall follow with brief recommendatory points on what issues should be properly looked at by the government and relevant government institutions to strengthen civil society.
8. Election 2018 and the Role of Civil Society
Civil society organizations are the third crucial pillar in the upcoming election process, following the election executors: the National Election Board, the government, and the competing political parties. Therefore, we believe that the following three primary roles are expected of them in the coming election.
A. Independent Election Observation
As is well known, this is the primary function of civil society. To perform this duty, following the authority granted under Articles 114 and 117 of the Ethiopia Electoral, Political Parties Registration and Election Ethics Proclamation No. 1162/2011, as well as Article 7(7) and Article 8(1) of the National Election Board of Ethiopia Establishment Proclamation No. 1133/2011 and in accordance with the Local Election Observers’ Accreditation, Operational Procedures and Ethics Directive No. 5/2012; the National Election Board of Ethiopia has registered and accredited 45 domestic civic society organizations to participate in the 7th general election as observers.
While the increased participation of civil society organizations in the seventh national election is a positive step for building democratic space, the organizations must demonstrate in practice that they are free from any political partisanship. As the Standing Committee urged, we wish to state that when organizations engage in election observation or educational activities, they must bring a “healthy mindset” and establish a structure for self-regulation by setting up a monitoring system led by an independent body to ensure questions regarding their neutrality do not arise.
Beyond this, civil society must properly monitor that the citizens’ voting and ballot counting are carried out according to law and procedure by being present at polling stations (especially those outside urban areas). Subsequently, they should strive to make their observations, whether weaknesses or strengths, public to the voting populace and the international community, thereby serving as a standard for determining the credibility of the election.
B. Voter Education
The Board has registered and accredited 143 civic society organizations to provide voter education for the next general national election. From this perspective, the role of civic society in providing inclusive, participatory, and transparent education to ensure voters have adequate knowledge is indeed irreplaceable.
It is necessary to remind that the awareness-raising work these accredited civil society organizations provide regarding the election should not only reach all segments of the voting community but also focus on reaching them in all possible languages, particularly emphasizing women and persons with disabilities. It is undeniable that the task of ensuring citizens have sufficient awareness of their rights and the voting process is primarily expected from civil society. In this regard, we believe they should go beyond encouraging citizens to participate actively in the election and help citizens make truth-based decisions by correcting false rumors circulating during the election period.
C. Creating Forums and Conflict Prevention
As has been widely written and observed in our political experience, since elections are inherently competitive, they can spark tensions. In this regard, we wish to remind that during both the pre-election and post-election periods, they should fulfill their civic responsibility by identifying signs that could trigger conflict and working on early warning tasks in collaboration with the government and relevant bodies. In connection with this, BRIDGE strongly requests that they facilitate dialogue forums well in advance to ensure a peaceful flow of ideas among competing political parties.
9. BRIDGE few Recommendations
In order to enable civil society to fulfill these roles in the upcoming election and in their activities thereafter, BRIDGE wishes to present the following brief recommendations to the relevant government structures.
A. Increasing Resource Supply
It is known that a year has passed since an American charitable organization, which used to be supported by the U.S. government, discontinued the support it was providing to civil society. The occurrence of this on top of the existing financial shortage in civil society has brought about widespread institutional weakening. Therefore, taking this into account, we say that the federal government and governmental development institutions that claim responsibility should prepare a legal framework through which indigenous organizations (especially recently established and newly forming ones) can obtain various domestic supports (for instance, incentives from income tax or other types of taxes) and should facilitate opportunities for capacity-building training and access to international financial sources. Beyond this, it may be necessary to remind that to reduce dependency on foreign aid, fostering a culture of domestic philanthropy and establishing a legal system through which organizations can obtain domestic financial support must not be overlooked.
B. Harmonizing National Security Vetting and the Right to Register
When citizens exercise their constitutional right to organize, it is indisputable that conducting the registration process in integration with the National Intelligence and Security Service is a guarantee for national security. However, this security vetting process should not serve as an excuse for delays in civil society registration, for the decrease in their numbers or as a bureaucratic obstacle. In this regard, BRIDGE wishes to mention at least three administrative measures that it believes should be taken to ensure institutional transparency and avoid unnecessary disruptions alongside reducing security risks.
The first is the necessity of having clear directives; the criteria for security investigation must be clearly identified and must not be guided by personal decisions that fall outside the legal framework. Secondly, as mentioned, while making the investigation process efficient and supported by a modern digital system, it must respect the registration time limits set by law. Finally, we say that the security vetting must move away from being a red line based on invisible bureaucratic or political desires regarding citizens’ fundamental rights and must facilitate conditions where legal organizations can enter into operation without any bureaucratic bottlenecks.